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Abstract
By taking the need for quantum reference frames into account, it is shown that
Hilbert-space factorization is a dissipative process requiring on the order of kT to
reduce by one bit an observer’s uncertainty in the provenance of a classically-recorded
observational outcome. This cost is neglected in standard treatments of decoherence
that assume that observational outcomes are obtained by interacting with a collection
of degrees of freedom identified a priori. Treating this cost explicitly leads to a natural
measure of the probability of any particular quantum reference frame.
Keywords: Classical information transfer; Decomposition; Einselection; Measure problem;
Observer; Quantum Darwinism; Quantum reference frame; Tensor-product structure
1 Introduction
Wojciech Zurek opened his 1998 “rough guide” to decoherence by noting that while physics
requires a universe split into systems, “it is far from clear how one can define systems given
an overall Hilbert space ‘of everything’ and the total Hamiltonian” ([1] p. 1794). In “Con-
sciousness as a State of Matter” [2], Max Tegmark takes up this Hilbert-space factorization
problem from an unusual direction: an analysis of the essential characteristics of an observer
loosely based on Tononi’s [3] information-integration theory of human consciousness. The
most important of these characteristics proves to be the “Principle of Utility” - the idea
that consciousness is good for something, namely prediction. This idea, which echoes the
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motivation for Zurek’s well-known “predictability seive” method for identifying einselected
and hence environmentally-encoded pointer states, at least hints at an anthropic solution
to the problem of defining preferred Hilbert-space factorizations: “if we find that useful
consciousness can only exist given certain strict requirements on the quantum factoriza-
tion, then this could explain why we perceive a factorization satisfying these requirements”
(p. 29).
This Comment focuses on the first of the three problems Tegmark highlights as standing
in the way of a full solution to the Hilbert-space factorization problem: what he calls the
“chicken-and-egg” problem of “what should we determine first: the state or the factoriza-
tion?” ([2] p. 28). An examination of this problem leads to an implicit assumption: the
assumption that the state of a quantum degree of freedom can be queried by interacting
with only that degree of freedom. This assumption is rendered in information-processing
terms as the assumption that Hilbert-space factorization is a freely-available resource. It
is then shown that this assumption is false: Hilbert-space factorization is not free. It is
limited and expensive. Recognizing that Hilbert-space factorization is expensive sheds new
light on the third problem Tegmark highlights, that of the emergence of time in unitary
dynamics. It suggests, in particular, that the useful Hilbert-space factorizations are pre-
cisely those that allow time to be measured, as it is in these factorizations that observers
are able locally to reduce entropy.
2 Factorization is a resource
With how many degrees of freedom must Schro¨dinger interact to determine whether his
cat is dead or alive? The standard answer is one: the cat is a qubit ψcat in some state
|ψcat〉 = α|dead〉 + β|alive〉 and Schro¨dinger needs merely to measure this qubit in the
{|dead〉, |alive〉} basis. This standard answer is encapulated in the standard picture of de-
coherence, here adapted from [4]: the total Hilbert space HU is factored into a 3-component
tensor product HU = HS ⊗ HO ⊗ HE where the “system” component HS contains only
the degrees of freedom of interest to the observer (the qubit ψcat in Schro¨dinger’s case),
the “observer” component HO contains only the degrees of freedom employed in the ob-
server’s representation of the observational outcome (e.g. Schro¨dinger’s representation of
the pointer values “dead” and “alive”) and the “environment” component HE contains all
other degrees of freedom in the universe, and in particular, all other degrees of freedom of
both Schro¨dinger and his cat. With this factorization, the overall Hamiltonian is:
HU = HS + HO + HE + HSO + HSE + HOE + HSOE, (1)
where the first three terms represent the internal dynamics of S, O and E respectively, HSO
represents the measurement interaction, HSE and HOE represent environmental decoherence
acting on S and O respectively, and HSOE represents any residual interaction and is never
discussed further. Figure 1 illustrates this situation.
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Fig. 1: Decoherence, adapted from [4],
Fig. 2. The residual 3-way interaction
HSOE is as usual taken to be negligible.
As emphasized in [4], the degrees of freedom of the environment component E are always
traced over: this trace operation is what enables decoherence by rendering any S - E or
O - E entanglement invisible to O. The observer can, therefore, have no knowledge of
HE; in practice, E is treated as a classical heat bath and the representations of HSE and
HOE are chosen to reflect this (e.g. [5, 6, 7]). Decoherence of S and O by HSE and HOE
respectively is taken to be effectively instantaneous, so that relative states of S and E can
be considered to be classically correlated, i.e. all observational outcomes can be considered
to have definite values.
With this representation of decoherence, the chicken-and-egg problem can be stated clearly:
if the factorization is given, pointer states of S follow by einselection, but finding an optimal
factorization requires knowing something about the current state of S. Tegmark summarizes
this second aspect of the problem as follows:
However, to find the best factorization, we need information about the state. A
clock is a highly autonomous system if we factor the Hilbert space so that the
first factor corresponds to the spatial volume containing the clock, but if the
state were different such that the clock were somewhere else, we should factor
out a different volume.
[2] p. 28
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This statement is interesting, in part, because the position of the spatial volume containing
a clock is seldom considered to be the clock’s pointer state: it is a degree of freedom that
would ordinarily be relegated to the “environment” component in Fig. 1. But let us suppose
that the spatial volume of interest is the particular spatial volume containing just the hand
of the clock, i.e. the volume for which the positional degree of freedom generally is regarded
as the clock’s pointer state. Does interacting only with this pointer degree of freedom allow
an observer to determine the time? Clearly not: the observer must also determine both the
position of the clock’s face and its angular orientation relative to some fixed point outside of
the clock. Unless the clock’s face is also observed, the position of the clock’s hand yields no
information about the time at all; indeed nothing about a “bare” hand indicates even that it
is the hand of a clock. The clock’s face serves here is a quantum reference frame [8] without
which the time cannot be determined from observations of the hand, and which must be
shared by any two observers both using the hand position to determine the time. Hence
Tegmark’s chicken-and-egg problem is more interesting than it at first appears: in order
to use information about the state of S to find an appropriate factorization, an observer
needs to employ a different factorization, one that picks out a quantum reference frame
that enables measurements of the state of S to convey useful information. To determine his
cat’s health, in other words, Schro¨dinger cannot simply measure the qubit ψcat. First he
has to pick out his cat from among the other degrees of freedom in the universe, and that
requires observing degrees of freedom - coat color, for example, or number of legs - other
than its health.
This situation generalizes, and it does so in a way that is instantly clear from the perspec-
tive of experimental design. Measuring any quantum degree of freedom, or any collection of
quantum degrees of freedom, that compose a system of interest S requires the prior identifi-
cation of some other set of quantum degrees of freedomR that compose a quantum reference
frame, one typically called an “apparatus.” No measurement can get off the ground until
the observer has located the apparatus with which the observation is to be made, and then
“prepared” the apparatus to assure that it is working properly. This preparation step re-
quires the observer to have some knowledge of the dynamics HR that govern the behavior
of R; hence R cannot be traced over. From the perspective of Fig. 1, this apparatus R is
part of E; indeed its ability to function as a quantum reference frame requires that it be
part of neither S nor O. Thus while any particular environmental degrees of freedom can
be incorporated by stipulation into S by adopting a revised factorization, some degrees of
freedom must remain in E to serve as a quantum reference frame. One could, for example,
bundle all the degrees of freedom of the LHC into S, but without the degrees of freedom
of the surrounding CERN infrastructure, the internet, or the local geography of Geneva
to serve as a reference frame, these degrees of freedom would not be identifiable as those
of the LHC, and hence would provide no useful information. An observer who pursues
von Neumann’s chain to the bitter end and bundles all degrees of freedom except her own
subjective representation of the outcome into S - and hence eliminates E altogether from
Fig. 1 - becomes a locus of “pure experience” [9] indistinguishable from a Boltzmann brain.
The observer’s carving-out of some subset of environmental degrees of freedom to serve as a
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quantum reference frame R is illustrated in Fig. 2. Here E′ is the traced-over remainder of
the environment, so HR⊗HE′ = HE. All terms in Eqn. 1 referring to E may be expanded:
HE = HR + HE′ + HRE′ ; (2)
HOE = HOR + HOE′ ; (3)
HSE = HSR + HSE′ ; (4)
where HE′ represents the internal dynamics of the environmental remainder E
′ and HRE′
represents its interaction with R. Neglecting higher-order terms as before, the qualitative
consequences of this carving out of R from E can be examined in the relevant two limits.
As E′ → E the observer interacts with a “bare pointer” unrelated to any reference frame
as in Fig. 1. As noted earlier in the case of a clock, the state of such a bare pointer
confers no useful information to O. As R → E, the reference frame expands to include
the entire rest of the universe. Bearing in mind that R only serves as a reference frame
for an observer capable of monitoring its degrees of freedom - monitoring the position and
orientation of the clock’s face while telling the time, for example - it is clear that this limit
is achievable only if O has sufficient encoding capacity to monitor the entire state of E,
i.e. only if O ≫ E. This condition, however, is just a re-labelling of Fig. 1 that swaps
O and E. It is the perspective of the “environment as witness” [10, 11] that not only
imposes decoherence but continuously monitors and hence encodes the states of all other
degrees of freedom. The situation of interest, therefore, lies between these limits: it is the
case of a “reasonable” quantum reference frame that enables measurements of S to convey
useful information without requiring that O have sufficient encoding capacity to monitor
the entire rest of the universe.
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Fig. 1: Decoherence, with a quantum
reference frame (QRF ) as part of the
environment. The interaction HRE′ is
defined at the dashed R-E′ boundary.
As emphasized in [8], quantum reference frames are resources that observers must provide if
they are to extract useful information from the world. Obtaining a quantum reference frame
requires having a factorization with which to distinguish it from the rest of the environ-
ment; hence such factorizations must also be considered resources. The question underlying
Tegmark’s chicken-and-egg problem is, therefore, the question of what these resources cost.
If factorizations are free resources, they can be treated as given and einselection does the
rest; hence if factorizations are free, the chicken-and-egg problem presents no difficulty in
practice.
3 Factorization is not free
If one considers the factorization that picks out the LHC as a resource, one receives a strong
hint that such resources are not free. Even constructing a meter stick requires energy. To
see that this cost is general, consider the process of observation from the perspective of
an observer equipped only with a single observable - say xˆ - and an effectively-classical
memory. The observer operates on the world with xˆ, and records a succession of position
eigenvalues in memory. As in the case of a human infant exploring her environment, or of an
“infant robot” such as the iCub [12], rendering these recorded eigenvalues useful for making
predictions requires solving an inverse problem. In particular, it requires determining when
two eigenvalues of xˆ were obtained from the same system S. In a more careful formalism in
which observables such as xˆ are defined as automorphisms on Hilbert spaces corresponding
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to particular collections of degrees of freedom, i.e. as xˆS1, xˆS2, etc. acting on Hilbert spaces
HS1, HS2, etc., this inverse problem is the problem of determining when two recorded
eigenvalues were produced by the same factorization-specific observable. Call this inverse
problem the “quantum system identification problem” or QSIP. The QSIP is the problem
of constructing a factorization given one or more classically-recorded outcome values; hence
it corresponds to the “egg” side of Tegmark’s chicken-and-egg problem, the side on which
factorizations are not assumed to be freely given. The fact that the outcome values have, by
assumption, been classically recorded requires that the constructed factorization supports
decoherence, i.e. that E (Fig. 1) or E′ (Fig. 2) are both sufficiently large and unobserved
by O and hence traced over.
In the language of quantum Darwinism [13], the QSIP is the problem of determining whether
two environmental encodings of a pointer state are redundant encodings of the same pointer
state produced by environmental interactions with a single system, or encodings of different
pointer states produced by environmental interactions with two different systems. Note that
in quantum Darwinism, each observer Oi has an effective quantum reference frame: the
fragment Fi of the environment in which that observer is confined. These fragments are
by definition non-overlapping, so observers cannot share a reference frame; hence they can
communicate only using fungible [8] information. As an observer has no observational access
to the boundary separating their fragment Fi from the rest of E - the dashed boundary in
Fig. 2 - they have no way of assuring that Fi remains the same reference frame from one
observation to the next. Hence any observer who makes multiple observations at different
times faces the QSIP, as does any pair of observers who wish to compare observations made
at the same time. Anyone who has mistaken a merely similar car for their own in a parking
lot, or has wondered whether they and a conversation partner are talking about the same
thing has encountered the QSIP.
That the QSIP is unsolvable in principle by finite sequences of non-destructive measure-
ments was proven in the early days of cybernetics: not even classical systems can be un-
ambiguously identified by such means [14, 15]. Destructive measurements are similarly
insufficient [16, 17]; to see this, it suffices to note that an observer seeking to identify the
source of an environmental encoding after a destructive manipulation of some system is in
exactly the same situation as they were in when attempting to identify the source of the
encoding before the manipulation. The reason for this difficulty is obvious: determining
the provenance of an environmental encoding requires access to the Hamiltonian of the
environment, and observational access to this Hamiltonian is removed by the trace over
E that is required for decoherence. An observer confined to an environmental fragment
R = Fi must, in particular, have access to HE = HR+HE′ +HRE′ , which both confinement
to Fi and the required trace over E
′ prevent. Thus while decoherence makes pointer states
useful for prediction by rendering them recordable in environmental fragments that serve
as classical memories, it undercuts this utility by rendering their provenance uncertain.
An observer who has traced over the environment knows only that she is currently inter-
acting with some system or other, hence her uncertainty about the source of a recorded
outcome value can be represented as an entropy (in bits):
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SF = klog2ΩF , (5)
where ΩF counts the number of distinct factorizations of HU that could have produced the
recorded value. For an observer who has recorded a binary string but has traced over E,
for example, ΩF is the number of qubits in the universe. For an observer equipped only
with a meter stick, ΩF counts the number of macroscopic objects. From the observer’s
perspective, SF is an entropy associated with E; it is the Hamiltonian HE that determines
which degree(s) of freedom the observer is interacting with. Again this is clearest from the
perspective of quantum Darwinism: if observers obtain information by examining encodings
of distant pointer states in their local environmental fragments, it is HE that determines
what pointer states have been encoded. Thus while the standard environmental entropy
SE measures an observer’s uncertainty about the state of the environment [4], the factor-
ization entropy SF effectively measures the observer’s uncertainty about the environment’s
dynamics. This distinction allows a clean re-statement of the central result of [4]: while
decoherence considerations show that only a relatively small number of observations are
required to determine the state of one’s local Hubble volume - in [4], to determine whether
it is post-inflationary and hence able to support life - under conditions of decoherence these
observations can reveal nothing about the dynamics of one’s local Hubble volume. De-
coherence allows SE to be low, but forces SF to be high. This is significant, because SF
measures uncertainty about which collections of degrees of freedom HU has carried into the
local Hubble volume. It is this uncertainty that drives the measure problem.
The factorization entropy SF is the hidden cost that observers pay for decoherence, the cost
of tracing over E. The common assumption that observers know the dynamical provenance
of their observations and hence know which degrees of freedom they are observing ignores
this hidden cost. Real observers, however, cannot ignore SF . They reduce SF by expending
energy to locally control the Hamiltonian of the environment. Observers exert this control
by organizing environmental degrees of freedom into quantum reference frames that are
continuously monitored and hence controlled by the quantum Zeno effect. The contributions
of environmental degrees of freedom that are monitored in this way can be subtracted from
ΩF , reducing uncertainty about the provenance of recorded outcome values. As quantum
reference frames tend to be macroscopic objects - meter sticks, voltmeters, computers,
laboratory buildings, orbiting telescopes, particle accelerators - each bit of uncertainty
reduction costs on the order of kT . Observation is, therefore, a bulk dissipative process:
observers are not just reducing the entropy of a few degrees of freedom contained in S as
described in standard models of decoherence (e.g. [4]) but are reducing the entropy of E
as well. It is this requirement for macroscopic entropy reduction in the environment that
explains the macroscopic Joules-per-bit cost of obtaining useful classical information even
from single qubits.
In addition to its energetic cost, monitoring a quantum reference frame requires a memory
expenditure of at least two bits for every environmental degree of freedom monitored - one
bit for the current outcome value plus one for the previous outcome value - plus sufficient
processing cycles to compare the current to the previous outcome value. An observer’s
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ability to reduce SF is, therefore, strictly limited by the observer’s access to both memory
and processing cycles. That sufficiently creative observers offload some of these memory
and computing requirements onto inexpensively-monitored components of the environment
is, therefore, not surprising.
Tegmark concludes his discussion of the chicken-and-egg problem by suggesting that “we
need a criterion for identifying conscious observers, and then a prescription that determines
which factorization each of them will perceive” ([2] p. 28-29). Consideration of the cost of
factorization suggests a heuristic: look around for chunks of the environment that aren’t
moving. Such low-entropy regions are probably being used by observers as quantum ref-
erence frames, and being held at low entropy by the quantum Zeno effect. Examining the
structure of these quantum reference frames will at least provide useful hints about what
factorizations the local observers perceive.
4 The emergence of time
In order to be useful, a quantum reference frame must be re-identifiable as the same quan-
tum reference frame over the course of multiple observations; as noted above, it is this
requirement that renders an otherwise-uncharacterized fragment of the local environment
useless as a reference frame. This requirement of re-identifiability applies, first and fore-
most, to the quantum reference frame essential for any observation: the observer’s memory.
An observer who cannot re-identify her own memory, and hence cannot distinguish previous
outcome values retrieved from memory from current outcome values received from the world
is critically handicapped, as the plight of patients with damage to the “reality monitoring
system” in Brodmann Area 10 of the prefrontal cortex demonstrates [18]. A memory that is
re-identifiable imposes a partial order on outcome values, even if it is only the partial order
distinguishing “previous” from “current” outcomes. Even the most primitive re-identifiable
memory, in other words, imposes subjective time.
If an encoding that imposes subjective time is necessary for useful factorizations, is it
sufficient? A factorization in which an observer continues to experience subjective time is
at least a factorization in which that observer still exists. Once observers are recognized
as energy-dissipating systems, this becomes non-trivial: it requires the joint action of the
Hamiltonians HOR, HO, and HOE′ to transfer net energy from E
′ to R and hence net
entropy from R to E′, and to continue doing so over macroscopic (subjective) time. An
observer O can, therefore, be characterized by a net lifetime contribution of ∆SF (O) to
the construction and maintenance of quantum reference frames. This is perhaps the best
definition of “utility” that can be hoped for.
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5 Conclusion
By examining Tegmark’s “chicken-and-egg” problem of “what should we determine first:
the state or the factorization?” [2], we have seen that the answer is “neither.” What
we should determine first, as Tegmark himself remarks in discussing this problem, is the
identity of the observer. Observers are dissipative systems that organize the environment
around them into quantum reference frames, which they then monitor in an attempt to
reduce their perceived factorization entropy SF . This activity constructs a factorization, or
rather an equivalence class of factorizations that support the monitored quantum reference
frames and thus have reduced entropy. Within this equivalence class of factorizations, the
provenance of any given observational outcome is still uncertain, but it is as certain as the
observer can make it.
Viewing Hilbert-space factorizations as expensive, observer-supplied resources turns the
usual notion of the “emergence of classicality” on its head. No physical process, least of
all decoherence, makes classical information freely available to observers. A traced-over
environment, in particular, is not a useful witness, as the provenance of its encodings and
hence their redundancy can never be determined [19]. Creating classical information takes
energy, on the order of kT per bit, and this energy must be expended by observers. What
“emerges” from the action of HU are dissipative systems that function as observers by
transferring net energy in their local neighborhoods of HU. Classical information in the
form of local net entropy transfer is a consequence of this activity.
A Hubble volume, from this perspective, is a large and incompletely-monitored quantum
reference frame. One may suggest, therefore, that the probability PV of a Hubble volume
is inversely proportional to the total entropy transfer required to maintain it. Assuming
that the average observer contributes a lifetime utility ∆SF (Oav ),
PV ∼ N
−1
O
(6)
where NO is the number of observers inhabiting the volume. With this measure, a Hubble
volume in which every source of free energy is thickly colonized by observers is unusual.
One like ours, in which the majority of stars at least appear to lack habitable planets, is
rather ordinary.
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